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THE EYE ALONE IS THE JUDGE: IMAGES AND
DESIGN PATENTS
Rebecca Tushnet*
Design patents are an area of intellectual property law focused entirely on the
visual, unlike copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret, or the various sui generis
protections that have occasionally been enacted for specific types of innovation.1
The law’s traditional bias against, even fear of, the visual2 may help explain why
design patents have been of less interest to many intellectual property scholars
than other bodies of IP law.3 Christopher Buccafusco has argued that “[p]atent
law most directly confronts the sense of sight in the field of design patent law,”
but that the result has been “considerable confusion and unhappiness among
courts and commentators.”4 He attributes this anxiety to the discomfort that
patent judges have “deciding questions of visual aesthetics,”5 and I would simply
strike “patent” from his description: Judges and lawyers in general are highly
uncomfortable with images, yet design patents force direct legal engagement with
images. This short piece offers an outsider’s view of what design patent law has
to say about the use of images as legal tools, why tests for design patent
infringement are likely to stay unsatisfactory, and what lessons other fields of
intellectual property, specifically copyright, might take from design patent.
Design patent offers a way to protect the aesthetic, nonfunctional elements
of a product design. Unlike copyright, which attaches to original works
automatically, design patent requires examination and registration by the Patent
and Trademark Office. A design patent itself is granted based on the drawing,
which defines the protected material, rather than on the written description that
predominates in utility patents.6 The law requires a “written description”7 of
* Professor, Georgetown Law. Thanks to participants at Georgia’s conference, including
Stacey Dogan, Jason Du Mont, Mark Janis, and Mark McKenna, and to Greg Vetter, who
provided helpful comments.
1 Proposals for fashion design protection in the U.S., if enacted, would add a design patentlike protection for fashion also focusing on the visual.
2 See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright Law, 125 HARV. L. REV.
683 (2012).
3 See Janice M. Mueller & Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the “Impossible Issue” of Nonobviousness
in Design Patents, 99 KY. L.J. 419, 423–24 (2010–2011) (contrasting design patent’s popularity with
patentees with its relative judicial and scholarly inattention).
4 Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 501,
524 (2012); see also id. at 527 (suggesting that “technophile” Federal Circuit judges “are particularly
anxious about the ‘subjective’ nature of visual pleasure”).
5 Id. at 524.
6 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 1503.01 (8th ed. rev. Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MPEP] (“No description of the design in the
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patent claims, but the drawing is the written description for design patents.
Though the Federal Circuit purported to reject the “linguist[ic]” distinction
between drawing and writing, it then concluded that the drawing in a design
patent is the key and the words are incidental: not a rejection but a reversal of
the usual valuation of words over images in law.8 Words purporting to claim a
design’s characteristic features cannot serve as a basis for patentability; overall
appearance is the key.9
The standard for infringement is also purely visual. In Gorham Co. v. White,
the Supreme Court stated that
if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one
patented is infringed by the other.10
Quoting an English case, the Court held that “the eye alone is the judge of the
identity of the two things.”11
But what does it mean for the eye to be the judge in a legal system organized
around words? How can the report of an eye be turned into a verdict, and
further into a reviewable judgment? In recent years, the Federal Circuit has

specification beyond a brief description of the drawing is generally necessary, since as a rule the
illustration in the drawing views is its own best description.” (citing In re Freeman, 23 App. D.C.
226 (D.C. Cir. 1904))); Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l, 157 F.3d 1311, 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (a design patent has “almost no scope beyond the drawings”); In re Mann, 861 F.2d
1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (a design patent is limited to what is shown in drawings); Application of
Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (“The test is inherently a visual test, for the design is
nothing more than appearance, and the appearance is that of the article as a whole.”).
7 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
8 In re Daniels, 144 F.3d 1452, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the drawings of the design patent
that provide the description of the invention. Although linguists distinguish between a drawing
and a writing, the drawings of the design patent are viewed in terms of the written description
requirement of § 112.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Concept Innovation v. CFM
Corp., No. 04 C 3345, 2004 WL 2812109, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2004) (“Unlike utility patents,
design patents do not describe claimed designs in words: ‘[n]o description, other than a reference
to the drawing, is ordinarily required . . . .’ ” (citations omitted)); see also MPEP, supra note 6
(“[W]hile not required, such a [textual] description is not prohibited . . . .”).
9 MPEP, supra note 6, § 1503.01 (citing In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388 (1982)). Moreover, “if a
description is presented, it must only describe the appearance of the article illustrated in the
drawings and not the construction or function of the claimed design.” Ronald L. Panitch, Design
Patents, C602 ALI-ABA 295, 303 (1991) (internal quotations omitted).
10 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 20 L. Ed. 731, 528 (1871).
11 Id. at 526 (quoting Holdsworth v. McCrea, 2 A.C., (H.L.), 388 (U.K.)).
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struggled with these questions. After experimenting, post-Markman,12 with
written descriptions as claim construction,13 the court determined that written
descriptions of a design patent should be avoided where possible.14 In Egyptian
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the en banc Federal Circuit held:
As the Supreme Court has recognized, a design is better
represented by an illustration “than it could be by any description
and a description would probably not be intelligible without the
illustration.” . . . Given the recognized difficulties entailed in
trying to describe a design in words, the preferable course
ordinarily will be for a district court not to attempt to ‘construe’ a
design patent claim by providing a detailed verbal description of
the claimed design.15
The key problem with this approach can be briefly stated, though not easily
resolved: Many designs involve non-novel or functional features, and are only
protectable because of other novel features, or because of a novel combination
of otherwise familiar features. But if the overall effect of the design on the eye
is the measure of infringement, how are factfinders to avoid potentially
broadening the scope of the design patent too far when an accused design looks
like a patented design because of similarities in these unprotectable features?16
12 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (setting out a standard for
claim construction in utility patent cases).
13 See Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Unlike the
readily available verbal description of the invention and of the prior art that exists in a utility
patent case, a design patent case presents the judge only with visual descriptions. Given the lack
of a visual language, the trial court must first translate these visual descriptions into words—i.e.,
into a common medium of communication. From this translation, the parties and appellate
courts can discern the internal reasoning employed by the trial court to reach its decision as to
whether or not a prior art design is basically the same as the claimed design.” (footnote omitted));
id. at 103 n.2 (“When properly done, this verbal description should evoke the visual image of the
design.”); Concept Innovation v. CFM Corp., No. 04 C 3345, 2004 WL 2812109, at *3
(describing the court’s role as “consider[ing] the patent’s ornamental features and visual pictures
as a whole to translate the patent’s visual descriptions into words that evoke the visual image”
(citations omitted)); Perry J. Saidman & Alison Singh, The Death of Gorham Co. v. White: Killing it
Softly with Markman, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 792 (2004).
14 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Minka
Lighting, Inc. v. Craftmade Int’l, Inc., No. 03-1162, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 770, at *5 (Fed. Cir.
Jan. 16, 2004) (“[A] district court need not always verbally construe at length a design patent’s
drawings. The infringement analysis essentially involves comparing the drawings to an accused
device; a verbal description of the drawings does not necessarily aid such a comparison.”).
15 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 679 (citations omitted).
16 See, e.g., Durling, 101 F.3d at 104 (finding that a district court construed the claimed design
“too broadly” and that the description “merely represents the general concept of a sectional sofa
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(The same problem comes up in copyright, where similarities in unprotectable
ideas or standard tropes should not suffice for liability, yet the gestalt substantial
similarity test risks holding defendants liable because of such commonalities.)
A written description requirement seemed to offer some hope of managing
the problem, since the factfinder could identify the novel elements of the design
in writing; only a defendant who copied those elements would infringe. A
written description requirement, that is, inherently limited the scope of a design
patent, serving as a screening device in the same way that courts’ increasingly
common demand for a written description for an unregistered trade dress now
does in trademark law.17
But the word and the image were in serious conflict. Critics noted that “it is
difficult to properly and precisely describe with words a design that consists of
anything more than simple geometric shapes. Usually the scope of the
description will be too broad, too narrow, or too ambiguous.”18 Given a single
picture, different people would produce very different written descriptions.19
Occasionally, courts suggested that judges in particular, untrained in art, couldn’t
perform the necessary translations,20 or that design patent drawings were different
from other types of images in ways that made them hard to describe: “Setting
down into words what visual impression is created by a fitting for plastic troughs
carrying fiber optic cables is a remarkably different endeavor than describing
with integrated end tables”).
17 Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and Advertising Law, 48
HOUS. L. REV. 861, 886–87 (2011).
18 Brief of Plaintiff Appellant Egyptian Goddess, Inc. for En Banc Appeal at 30 Egyptian
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (2008) (No. 2006-1562), 2008 WL 545145, at *30
[hereinafter Egyptian Goddess en banc brief]. Egyptian Goddess en banc brief, at 30; see also
Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886) (“[The design] is better represented by the photographic
illustration than it could be by any description, and a description would probably not be intelligible
without the illustration.”); In re Freeman, 23 App. D.C. 226, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1904) (“Undoubtedly, in
the matter of application for a patent for a design, a picture of the design serves to convey a greatly
more adequate idea of the design than any verbal description could possibly do; and, in the presence
of the picture, a superadded verbal description is generally useless and oftentimes confusing.”);
Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Supporting Reversal),
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (2008) (No. 2006-1562), at *5 n.7 [hereinafter
Apple Brief] (“[T]he standard that verbal descriptions of designs be ‘properly done [in order to]
evoke the visual image of the design’ has proven unattainable; words simply cannot evoke accurate
visual images.” (quoting Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996))).
19 See Egyptian Goddess en banc brief, supra note 18, at 30–31.
20 See Friedley-Voshardt Co. v. Reliance Metal Spinning Co., 238 F. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)
(“[I]t is very difficult to put in words a description which so differentiates [the claimed design]
from the prior art as to convey any vivid impression to one reading this opinion. This is largely
due to the inherent difficulty of describing visual impressions in words, which is, of course,
heightened where the person attempting it is without technical training in drawing or art.”).
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one’s visual impression of Rembrandt’s ‘The Syndics of the Drapers’
Guild.’ . . . [A] picture is its own best description.”21 The easily interpretable
image might be out there somewhere, in art class, but not before the court.
Other courts suffered logorrhea in trying to write legalistically precise
descriptions of designs, when pictures would be much clearer in practice.22
Compare the picture below with the description immediately following, if you
can force your way through it:

ADC Telecomm., Inc. v. Panduit Corp., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1032–33 (D. Minn. 2002).
See, e.g., Bernardo Footwear, L.L.C. v. Fortune Dynamics, Inc., 2007 WL 4561476, at *2
(S.D. Tex. 2007) (detailed description of ornamental design for a thong sandal); Durdin v.
Kuryakyn Holdings Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (long description of
ornamental design for a motorcycle brake or clutch lever).
21
22
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The ‘539 design patent claim is directed to an ornamental
design for a combined ceiling fan and light having fan blades that
overlie corresponding arms of a central bracket. The central
bracket has a circular central opening through which a light
fixture dome protrudes downward. The bracket has curved, finshaped arms, each of which sweeps outward from its base at the
central opening and each of which terminates in a slightly
rounded tip. The arms of the bracket are equally spaced about
the central opening, and the length of each bracket arm is roughly
one-third the length of the corresponding blade. The light fixture
dome exhibits a partial sphere that transitions into a generally
cylindrical portion adjacent the central bracket. A central
housing, located above the fan blades, exhibits a generally
cylindrical portion just above the fan blades that transitions into a
concave portion.
When viewed from below, the fin-shaped arms of the central
bracket [sweep] outward from the central opening in a clockwise
direction, which gives the appearance of a “running” pointed star.
A symmetrical, elongated, generally football shaped cutout
appears behind the leading edge of each arm. The fan blades are
also swept in the clockwise direction, with the leading edges of
the blades forming a sweeping curve near the bracket central
opening. The trailing edges of the blades are straight but slightly
offset from a diameter of the bracket central opening. The
trailing edge of each blade smoothly transitions into the trailing
edge of the corresponding bracket arm, which further forms a
curved transition into the leading edge of the next bracket arm.
A gently receding arc in front of each bracket arm’s leading edge
runs from the tip of each arm to the middle of the smooth
transition. Each fan blade terminates in a gently rounded corner
on the leading edge and a sharply angled, rounded corner on the
trailing edge. From its tip, the trailing edge of each bracket arm
flares inwardly and rearwardly away from the straight trailing edge
of the corresponding blade until it intersects the leading edge of
the following blade. Due to the sweep of the bracket arms, the
leading edge of each fan blade is substantially more exposed than
in the trailing edge of each fan blade.
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When viewed from above, the fan blades are swept in the
counter-clockwise direction, which also gives the appearance of a
pointed “running” star. Also when viewed from above, the
trailing edge of the bracket arm is visible at the base of each fan
blade.23
In this case, a picture is worth over 400 words. Which artifact, the image or
the text, provides a clearer understanding of the protected matter?
It’s not that the problem of ambiguity is unknown to text, of course—
ambiguities abound in contract cases, advertising law cases, and myriad other
legal disputes based on text. Still, critics of written descriptions in design patent
cases maintained that images were routinely harder to translate into words than
other artifacts such as the products or processes claimed by utility patents.24
In addition, those who advocated avoiding written descriptions invoked the
concept of “verbal overshadowing.”25 Though they did not use the term or cite
the scientific literature on the ways in which using words can change
perceptions of nonverbal stimuli,26 they made the same argument as found in
that literature: People who produce a verbal description of a visual object do
not see that object in the same way as people who just look at it.27 Opponents
of written descriptions thus argued that fact finders’ decisions would be
distorted by words, giving too much or too little emphasis to features of a
design depending on the words chosen.28 The result, Apple Computer claimed
Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Craftmade Int’l, Inc., 2002 WL 1331883, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
See Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae The Houston Intellectual Property Law Association in
Support of Neither Party, at 19, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., No. 2006-1562, 2008 WL
699184, at *20 [hereinafter Houston Brief] (arguing that Markman’s claim construction holding
was based on precedent dealing solely with judicial construction of written instruments, not
“visually defined” patent grants).
25 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 735.
26 Id. at 691.
27 Id. at 735–38.
28 See, e.g., Saidman & Singh, supra note 13, at 793 (arguing that verbalization leads factfinders
to compare the accused design with the verbalization, not with the patented design, thus further
leading them to require a finding of all the elements verbalized in the description before
infringement can be found, which obscures the reaction of the ordinary observer to the design as
a whole); Egyptian Goddess en banc brief, supra note 18, at 31 (“[W]hen a drawing is described in
words, the words have a tendency to make all portions of the drawing perceptively equivalent
unless the words expressly increase or decrease the visually perceptive importance of a particular
feature, i.e., by using adjectives and adverbs and by using descriptive terms such as major, minor,
prominent, dominant, etc. . . . However, when descriptive words are used to increase or decrease
the visually perceptive importance of a particular design feature, the drawing then is not being
merely observed by the jury, but rather is being observed by the jury as the design has been interpreted
and expressed in words by the court. The problem with this is that a jury (after being properly
23

24
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in its amicus brief in Egyptian Goddess, was that defendants won summary
judgments eight times more often than plaintiffs did, because of written
descriptions that distorted the scope of design patents.29
Of course, this is only a defect if you own design patents. For those who
feared being sued more than they wanted to sue, written descriptions were
correspondingly more popular.30 However, it’s not particularly attractive to set

instructed on the ordinary observer test) may or may not place the same perceptive emphasis on a
design element as the court.” (emphasis in original)); Brief of Amicus Curiae American
Intellectual Property Law Assoc. in Support of Neither Party at 25, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v.
Swisa, Inc., No. 2006-1562, 2008 WL 644360, at 34 (Feb. Cir. 5, 2000) [hereinafter AIPLA Brief]
(“A juror’s perception of the overall appearance of the claimed design may very well differ from
the court’s expressed verbalization (and for that matter the court’s perception). It is also possible
that a juror’s perception may change after reading the court’s construction. Even if the court only
provides the written instruction as a guide, the same problems of undue influence or changed
perception may arise. Such a predicament is bound to yield inconsistent and compromised
results.”); Apple Brief, supra note 18, at 9–10 (“Since words are a poor substitute for how a design
actually appears to the eye, a verbalized design patent claim can only divert the task of the jury
from its age-old mandate. . . . [T]he jury is likely to check whether each of the words in the
verbalization are found in the accused design, akin to a literal infringement test, rather than
whether the designs are visually substantially the same. Thus, verbalization derogates how the
claimed design actually appears to the eye.” (citation omitted)); Brief of Amici Curiae Electrolux
Home Products, Inc. and Nike, Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Supporting Reversal) at 20,
Egyptian, Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., No. 2006-1562, 2008 WL 644361 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2008)
(“[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to describe with clarity the ‘meaning’ of the patented design as
a whole. Indeed, verbalization of the design elements often can lead to certain elements being
emphasized to the exclusion of others, all because of the word choice made by the court during
the claim construction process. The jury may be confused and erroneously believe that emphasis
should be given to certain design elements, while at the same time being instructed to focus on
the overall appearance of the design as shown in the drawings.”); Brief for Amicus Curiae
Industrial Designers Society of America in Support of the Reversal Sought by Plaintiff-Appellant
at 1, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., No. 2006-1562, 2008 WL 644362 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1,
2008) [hereinafter Industrial Designers Brief] (“It serves no purpose to construe the design patent
drawings in words, and then to compare those words to the accused design. The words will
necessarily either broaden or restrict the scope of the design patent claim, in an unpredictable
manner.”); Houston Brief, supra note 24, at 20–21 (“[V]erbalization of design patent
claims . . . invites improper violation of a design patent litigant’s jury trial right. . . . It is not
appropriate for the fact finder to compare a court’s detailed description of the patented design
with the accused design. Overly detailed description of a design patent’s drawings, however,
invites the fact finder to not observe, i.e., to not conduct the fundamental exercise required to
determine whether infringement exists.” (citations omitted)).
29 See Apple Brief, supra note 18, at 10 & n.12.
30 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Lkg Corp. et al., Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., No.
2006-1562, 2008 WL 1376324 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 18, 2008). Reliance on images favors the patentee
at the infringement stage: It’s easier to identify differences between designs using words. But this
same characteristic has a different valence when novelty is assessed. When seeking a patent, the
applicant is likely to want to identify specific details that differentiate a design from the prior art.
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a standard with the aim of causing one side to lose more often, unless we
actually have a good reason to want that result. The difficulty of describing a
design may have nothing to do with how novel it is or how likely another
design is to be confusingly similar to it.31
The written description does at least attempt to create a reviewable record
and to ask questions that can sometimes be answered on summary judgment.32
As with copyright infringement, the ordinary observer test makes design patent
infringement findings harder to review and analyze; as gestalts, they are difficult
to dissect.33 As a result, favoring visual comparison over written descriptions
will be likely to favor design patent owners over accused infringers.34 With
visual comparisons, it’s easier to say “these just look alike to me” (and harder to
grant summary judgment or a motion to dismiss based on a lack of similarity)
whereas written descriptions require more precise identification of the design’s
novelty compared to earlier designs. This subjectivity predictably increases a
defendant’s costs of even a successful defense, making it more likely that
legitimate competition will be suppressed by legal threats. (The force of this
conclusion will depend on one’s assessment of the relative prevalence of
infringers and legitimate competitors in the market; with enough of the former
around, we might be willing to sacrifice a few of the latter, and vice versa.)
This argument about uncertainty as encouragement to less meritorious
plaintiffs did not convince the Federal Circuit in Egyptian Goddess. One reason
may be that images often seem transparent to us: They seem so clearly to mean
one thing that we doubt that other people will see them differently—even
though people do see the same image in very different ways, and even though
we understand that different people will produce very different verbal
descriptions of the same image.35 This supposed transparency allowed
proponents of an image-based standard to contend that focusing on images
would make outcomes easier to predict: Anyone could look and see whether two
Later, with the patent in hand, pictures and generalities will be more appealing.
31 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademarking and Advertising Law, 48
HOUS. L. REV. 861, 890 (2011) (discussing this problem with respect to trade dress).
32 See Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“From this
translation, the parties and appellate courts can discern the internal reasoning employed by the
trial court to reach its decision as to whether or not a prior art design is basically the same as the
claimed design.”).
33 See Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement 28 (Stanford Public
Law Working Paper No. 1661434), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1661434 (copyright
infringement).
34 See Perry J. Saidman, Egyptian Goddess Exposed! But Not in the Buff(er), 90 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859, 884–85 (2008).
35 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 688–93.
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designs were too similar.36 The history of the ordinary observer test in
copyright cases involving images is, to put it mildly, not promising on this
point.37 Unfortunately, it may be very difficult for any given observer to
understand how, in the absence of bad faith, another person could see
something else in that image; obviousness cuts off analysis.
Moreover, images are themselves highly manipulable. In a design patent, by
controlling how the design looks in the patent—which representational
conventions to observe—the patentee can influence judgments about whether
similar designs are sufficiently similar to infringe:
[F]or a given selected design, a number of different sets of
drawings can be prepared. For example, phantom lines can be
applied to “prior art” aspects of a design, so that a patent holder
can focus attention, for that particular embodiment, on the new
feature or “point of novelty.” If there are a number of such
features, by showing those features as solid lines and other
portions in phantom, again the patent holder can direct attention
where desired, with respect to the evaluation of infringement.”38
Nonetheless, the en banc Federal Circuit largely endorsed the idea that the
images should be allowed to speak for themselves. There remained the
problem of functional and non-novel features, as well as of special
characteristics of design patent drawings, such as the broken lines used to
identify features that are not claimed as part of the design, and that a jury would
not know how to interpret without instruction. In those cases, even opponents
of written descriptions conceded that words ought to be used to clarify matters
for the fact finder,39 and the en banc Egyptian Goddess court agreed.40

Saidman & Singh, supra note 13, at 807–08.
Tushnet, supra note 2, at 734.
38 Randy A. Hillson & Julie R. Daulton, Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa: A Tale of Two Tests, in THE
IP BOOK, at 9; see also Saidman & Singh, supra note 13, at 799 (claiming visual determinations
make infringement easier to find because similarities are more apparent than when using verbal
descriptions).
39 See, e.g., Egyptian Goddess en banc brief, supra note 18, at 52; Industrial Designers Brief,
supra note 28, at 1–2 (functionality); cf. Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Craftmade Int’l, Inc., 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 770, at *5 (more extensive verbalizations “may be helpful particularly if the drawings
contain features that are not part of the patented design, e.g., if the drawings contain functional
features or if there is a point of novelty issue to consider”).
40 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
36

37
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Later, the Federal Circuit approved a process of dissecting a design to screen
out identified functional features before performing a holistic assessment.41
Unfortunately, these two steps are fundamentally contradictory, since analytic
dissection interferes with gestalt evaluation.42 One sign of this incompatibility
comes from cases that recite Egyptian Goddess’s disavowal of written description
as a means of defining and limiting the scope of a design patent, then use
hundreds of words to describe why prior art is so similar to the accused design
that there can be no infringement.43 Pictures, it seems, routinely fail to speak
for themselves.
This is not to say that concerns driving a two-step test are misguided: Those
who argue that a proper infringement analysis shouldn’t involve any dissection,
because ordinary observers don’t decompose designs into their constituent
elements or filter out functional or unprotectable parts,44 face difficulty when
dealing with accused designs that are also highly similar to the prior art.45 Even
if a design patent’s scope is essentially limited to the drawing, applying the
infringement standard that ordinary observers would be deceived into thinking
the plaintiff’s and defendant’s designs are the same will often require some
reference to prior art, since non-expert observers would otherwise be tempted

See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
See Shin Chang, The Proper Role of Functionality in Design Patent Infringement Analysis: A Criticism of
the Federal Circuit Decision In Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 309, 325
(2011) (“Filtering or ignoring any element, let alone individual functional elements, from a construed
claim before applying the ordinary observer test inevitably changes the overall appearance of the
patented design.”); Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Designing the American Patent System 41–42 &
n.259, http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1862182 (pointing out the incompatibilities in this approach); see
also Tushnet, supra note 2, at 736–38 (making the same point about the similar two-step process in
copyright infringement doctrine).
43 See Arc’teryx Equipment, Inc. v. Westcomb Outerwear, Inc., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1894, 1895 (D.
Utah 2008) (“[I]t is unnecessary to construe the . . . Patent by providing a detailed verbal
description of the claimed design. Rather, the Court will rely upon the illustrations . . ., as they
better represent the claimed design.”); id. at 1896 (using 389 words to explain how the ordinary
observer would see the patented and accused jackets, then providing further verbal descriptions
of the prior art in the course of finding noninfringement).
44 See, e.g., Christopher V. Carani, The New “Extra-Ordinary” Observer Test For Design Patent
Infringement—On a Crash Course With The Supreme Court’s Precedent in Gorham v. White, 8 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 354, 357, 370 (2009); Sylvia Ngo, Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa:
Patently Obvious? Reconciling the Ordinary Observer and Point of Novelty Tests, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J.
110, 125 (2010).
45 See Carani, supra note 44, at 378–79 (admitting that fact finders will have to be educated
about prior art).
41
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to lump too many things together.46 “They all look alike to me” is a cliché for a
reason.
We do not want a standard that lets a fact finder conclude that a copy of the
prior art infringes a patented design. We have two possible ways of avoiding
this result: We could have a validity/nonobviousness standard that invalidates
design patents entirely in such cases, or we could have a rule requiring that the
confusing similarity necessary for infringement must relate to the protectable
elements of the patented design. The former standard would invalidate large
numbers of design patents (and pose serious litigation challenges of its own);
the latter seems like more of a compromise, allowing more design patents but
limiting their scope and forcing us to administer their boundaries with greater
care. But the resulting test will continue to seem unsatisfactory because it is
trying to serve two masters: holistic assessment of confusing similarity and
filtration of unprotectable elements.
Assuming we want to prevent findings of infringement when two designs
are only similar in non-novel aspects, how can this best be done?47 Instead of
using only words, we could give the fact finder pictures of the prior art. If an
accused design was more similar to the closest prior art than to the patented
design, then there should be no infringement, as in the following case:

46 See, e.g., Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(infringement exists if an ordinary observer familiar with the prior art would be deceived into
believing that the accused design is the same as the patented design).
47 See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that
deceptive similarity must be the result of similarities in overall design, not of similarities in
functional features); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“For a design patent to be infringed, however, no matter how similar two items look, ‘the
accused device must appropriate the novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from
the prior art.’ That is, even though the court compares two items through the eyes of the
ordinary observer, it must nevertheless, to find infringement, attribute their similarity to the
novelty which distinguishes the patented device from the prior art.” (citations omitted)).
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48

The American Intellectual Property Law Association offered the following
hypothetica

49

In a vacuum, the two designs look highly similar and the accused design
seems likely to be infringing. Now suppose that, in fact, the prior art contains a
design that looks almost exactly like the accused design—it’s the heart in the
top right corner of the patented design that is the novel feature. Once the prior

48 Coca-Cola Co. v. Whistle Co. of America, 20 F.2d 955, 957 (D. Del. 1927) (“Save for such
similarity as results from the common use of the ogee curve [found in the prior art] . . ., the most
casual observer would find no difficulty in distinguishing [the patented] bottle from the [accused
bottle].”).
49 AIPLA Brief, supra note 28, at 2.
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art is taken into account, a finding of noninfringement should follow.50 But
AIPLA made its case particularly easy by positing prior art just like the accused
design. Suppose the prior art has a circle where the patented design has a heart:
if the novelty consisted of changing the circle to a heart, does changing the
circle to a star copy the novel aspect of the patented design? Pictures alone
can’t answer what are fundamentally normative and empirical questions about
consumers’ perceptions of confusing similarity.51 Fact finders will still have to
make judgments about how far the penumbra of any particular design or piece
of prior art extends.
Still, for an outsider to design patent law, the suggested multi-image
comparison approach has obvious merits for limiting the scope of design
patents to novel aesthetic innovations, at least where there is substantial prior
art (as there will often be). For someone more familiar with copyright law, one
natural question is whether a similar approach could help in copyright law,
where substantial similarity as a test for copyright infringement is a mess.52
I think we’d be better off without the doctrine of substantial similarity, and
with a true reproduction right, with highly similar works dealt with as derivative
works.53 However, since that’s unlikely to happen, it’s worth thinking about
whether substantial similarity doctrine could be improved by, in essence, placing
the plaintiff’s work alongside an array of prior art and trying to place the
accused work in the “space” defined by the expressive universe.54 When asking
whether the similarity between two works is too great, we might then frame the
question whether the similarity between the plaintiff’s work and the accused
work is any greater than the similarity between the accused work and other
50 See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(“When the differences between the claimed and accused design are viewed in light of the prior
art, the attention of the hypothetical ordinary observer will be drawn to those aspects of the
claimed design that differ from the prior art. And when the claimed design is close to the prior
art designs, small differences between the accused design and the claimed design are likely to be
important to the eye of the hypothetical ordinary observer.”).
51 In the context of invalidity for obviousness, the Federal Circuit has attempted to deal with
the question of how far the “penumbra” of any given design extends by requiring a single primary
reference “basically the same as the claimed design” before an obviousness challenge can be
made. Then, the primary reference can be modified by other secondary references related to the
primary reference. See Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1386 (Fed.
Cir. 2009). The court specifically declined to opine on whether a similar approach should be used
for infringement. In the example in the text, if the primary reference had a circle and the
patented design had a heart, the Titan Tire approach would not seem to help determine whether a
star was “too close” to the heart.
52 Lemley, supra note 33; Tushnet, supra note 2.
53 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 45–46.
54 Cf. Ngo, supra note 44, at 128 (stating that copyright lacks the concept of prior art).
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noninfringing expressions of the same idea, where other expressions have been
identified.
The idea/expression distinction means that only expression can be owned,
and ideas may be freely copied. Usually copyright cases formally use the
distinction to compare two isolated works. Yet the concept of an unprotectable
idea necessarily implies the existence of many other works, both actual and
potential. Tropes, scènes à faire (events or characters standard in works of a
particular type), and other generic features are unprotectable, but identifying
them generally requires some concept of a “standard” work of the relevant type.
Thus, in practice, defendants will often point to other works on the same topics
and sharing the same similarities that plaintiffs claim show infringement of their
particular works.55
The barriers to using prior art as a useful addition to copyright’s arsenal are
primarily two: First, unlike patent infringement, copyright infringement requires
actual copying. Thus, even if two works are more similar to each other than to
any pre-existing work, there will be no infringement unless the defendant
actually copied the plaintiff’s work; inversely, if the defendant copied the
plaintiff’s work, it is no defense to say that another work is, coincidentally, even
more similar to the defendant’s work. Given the copying requirement, it can be
conceptually muddled to bring in the idea of prior art, of which neither the
defendant nor the plaintiff may actually have been aware, as a restriction on the
scope of a copyright.56 Thus, in copyright, the purpose of familiarizing a factfinder with the prior art as part of an infringement inquiry would have to be
different than for design patents: Prior art might provide evidence that any
similarities between the works are due not to the defendant’s copying but to the
common cultural well from which both works drew.

55 See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding no copyright protection
for the title/lyrics “You’re the One for Me” where “hundreds of composers have registered songs
capturing the same sentiment in the same verbiage”); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155
F.3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding district court’s finding that the phrase “you’ve got to
stand for something, or you’ll fall for anything” was not protectable because it “enjoyed a robust
existence in the public domain long before [plaintiff] employed it for his song’s title and in the
key lyrics”); Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720–21 (9th Cir. 1976)
(common musical phrases); Capcom Co. v. Mkr. Grp., Inc., 2008 WL 4661479 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
20, 2008) (zombie stories); Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Embassy Pictures, 1982 WL
1274, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 1982) (“[T]he pose of loving couples, even against a tropical
background, is too common to constitute protectible expression.”).
56 As for the plaintiff, as long as the plaintiff contributed expression of her own rather than
copying, the fact that she produced a run-of-the-mill work is irrelevant to its protectability; there
is no novelty requirement as in patent.
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Second, design patent does not have an idea/expression distinction. The
idea/expression distinction puts some parts of a copyrighted work immediately
in the public domain even if they are entirely new: new ideas or new facts and
discoveries.57 Even if there is no relevant prior art, then, a copyright’s scope is
still more limited than that of a patent, which can protect new designs or
discoveries. For example, the first person to write a story about a zoo filled
with dinosaurs recreated from their DNA does not have a copyright monopoly
on the overall concept, even if she was truly the first. Indeed, when two works
use the same core idea, similarities in other plot elements that naturally follow—
in order to create drama, the animals must escape, and so on—are also freely
copiable.58
For these reasons, I do not advocate for wholesale incorporation of design
patent infringement analysis in copyright infringement analysis. However, the
conceptual insight that is front and center in many design patent infringement
inquiries could still be useful: Works exist within a field of other works. As a
result, fact finders can get relevant information by assessing other works in the
same field. This idea, though implicit in many copyright cases, could be made
more explicit.59 Looking at prior art in copyright could help define what
constitutes protectable expression and what is merely an idea or concept that
should not be subject to any single creator’s control. Distance from existing
works should not be the sole test for substantial similarity in copyright, for the
reasons noted above, but it could help make the elusive distinction between
idea and expression more concrete in specific cases, such as the multiple
infringement claims against the hit film Avatar, each arguing that Avatar copied
the plaintiff’s story of a military type who rebels against his superiors in order to
save an endangered civilization.60
57 Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 147.
58 See Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 589–90 (2d Cir. 1996).
59 For a contrasting approach, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in
Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2014395. Balganesh suggests that courts should determine the conceptual
“thickness” of a plaintiff’s copyright without reference to the defendant’s work because what’s
protectable “can be gleaned entirely from the plaintiff’s work, perhaps with the aid of external
evidence such as expert testimony.” Id. at 24. Balganesh assumes that conventions can routinely
be inferred from single exemplars, and skims over the insufficiencies of that approach by
referring vaguely to “expert testimony,” which will presumably explain which parts of the
plaintiff’s work are common. But that’s a vital part of the process, not an add-on: Someone
who’d never encountered a Western could have great difficulty distinguishing generic features
from unique scenarios, much like someone who’d never encountered the designs discussed in
text.
60 Eriq Gardner, Know Your ‘Avatar’ Lawsuits: Meet Three Plaintiffs Who Hope to Win Billions,
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In fact, the contrast between copyright and design patent helps illuminate
the problems with Samson Vermont’s idea that uniqueness is the key to
copyright.61 Because copyright protects expression, not ideas, having a really
novel idea (while it might justify a broad utility or design patent) does not justify
a broad copyright. As Judge Kozinski has written, “I can’t publish
unauthorized copies of, say, Presumed Innocent; I can’t make a movie out of it.
But I’m perfectly free to write a book about an idealistic young prosecutor on
trial for a crime he didn’t commit.”62 In such cases, we would recognize the
immediate source of the second author’s idea while also recognizing that his
work was a very different expression of that idea. While Vermont argues that
the high concept “prairie dog meets seahorse on Pluto” is so unique that it
should be protected against copying,63 the cases correctly hold that copying a
premise is simply insufficient to infringe.64 Dinosaur zoos; zombies in a mall;
snakes on a plane: All are entertaining ideas, but not as such protected
copyrighted works even at the point at which only the plaintiff’s and the
defendant’s work embody those ideas. As a result, one key implication of the
idea/expression distinction is that, while design patent cases consider only
existing prior art,65 in copyright we must also consider other possible
noninfringing expressions of the same idea, to help define the metes and
bounds of a particular expression.
Prior art, even in pictures instead of words, is no more a panacea in design
patent than it is in copyright. In the end, a picture may be worth a thousand
words, but it cannot substitute for a final judgment about how close is too

HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Dec. 20, 2011, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/avatar-la
wsuits-james-cameron-new-plaintiffs-275707.
61 Samson Vermont, The Sire Qua Non of Copyright is Uniqueness, Not Originality, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1906047. Vermont argues that patents are different from copyrights
because inventions, unlike expressive works, are “constrained by shared reality.” Id. at 34. His
analysis therefore ignores design patents, not to mention the social constraints that makes
“utility” much more about human choices than about the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology.
See Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUSTON L. REV. 823, 853–54 (2011) (explaining that
utilitarian functionality is often a matter of socially constructed desires and expectations).
62 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514–15 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).
63 Vermont, supra note 61, at 59–60.
64 See, e.g., Benay v. Warner Bros. Ent’mt Inc., 607 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2010) (American
becomes samurai in Meiji Japan); Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Ent’mt Co., 462 F.3d 1072
(9th Cir. 2006) (small funeral home taken over by two brothers after their father’s death).
65 Design patent obviousness determinations can involve hypothetical prior art created by
combining references. See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1240
(Fed. Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, even these hypotheticals must be created by combining existing
designs.
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close. Design patent cases suggest the difficulties embedded even in the most
apparently limited images. While design patents are in theory limited almost
precisely to the image shown in the patent, and therefore patentees may even
submit photos instead of more manipulable drawings,66 difficult questions of
scope continue to arise as patentees assert the right to prevent more than pure
copying. Indeed, in the recent Apple/Samsung litigation, the jury held Samsung
liable for over a billion dollars in damages, in significant part because of Apple’s
design patents on portions of its products, rather than on their overall
appearance.67 If substantial similarity is sufficient for infringement, we need to
know what’s enough to be substantial, and what constraints there will be on the
factfinder, especially when some kinds of copying (such as copying elements
already in the public domain) are supposed to be favored by public policy.
Punting to the overall impression of the image is not enough, even though it’s
always a temptation.

66 See William J. Rankin, The “Person Skilled in the Art” Is Really Quite Conventional: U.S. Patent
Drawings and the Persona of the Inventor, 1870-2005, in MAKING AND UNMAKING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CREATIVE PRODUCTION IN LEGAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 55, 60 (Mario
Biagioli, Peter Jaszi, and Martha Woodmansee eds. 2011) (“[For design patents], standards for
both disclosure and protection are more narrowly circumscribed and the primary worth of the
patent is to establish successful reduction to practice, as in a simple registration system (similar to
copyright). Not coincidentally, plants and designs are often accompanied by photographs, and
photographs tend to provide only mimetic evidence; neither explanatory nor ambiguous, they are
useful primarily for proving infringement.” (footnotes omitted)).
67 See Sarah Burstein, Guest Post: Design Patents and Apple v. Samsung, MADISONIAN.NET,
Aug. 27, 2012, http://madisonian.net/2012/08/27/guest-post-design-patents-and-apple-v-sams
ung-2/ (discussing the relevance of the patent drawings and Apple’s design patents on portions of
the overall products); Michael Risch, Brief Initial Thoughts on Apple v. Samsung,
MADISONIAN.NET, Aug. 25, 2012, http://madisonian.net/2012/08/25/brief-initial-thoughts-on-a
pple-v-samsung/ (noting the breadth of the design patent infringement claims in the case).

